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ASSESSING THE ROLE OF EU AGENCIES 
IN THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS: 
THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN AVIATION 
SAFETY AGENCY*
Florin Coman-Kund** 
Summary: This paper examines from a legal perspective the modes 
in which EU agencies partake in the enlargement process. In so do-
ing, ﬁ rst the main forms in which agencies become involved in EU 
enlargement are explored. Next, EU agencies’ forms of participation 
in the enlargement process are subjected to a legal assessment tak-
ing the principle of institutional balance and the delegation of powers 
within the EU as the main yardsticks. In this context, the legal nature 
of such forms of participation and related instruments are discussed, 
as are some of the relevant legal problems they might raise. The paper 
examines these issues both with regard to the wider category of EU 
agencies and by focusing on the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA), an agency actively involved in the enlargement process, in 
order to provide a concrete illustration of how agencies’ involvement 
works in practice. It is argued that, apart from the formalised coop-
eration instruments that could result in legally binding agreements 
under international law, the forms in which EU agencies take part 
in the enlargement process do not create insurmountable legal and 
practical problems. As for the more controversial category of ‘binding 
agreements’ concluded by EU agencies, objections can be raised in 
view of the rather conventional reading by the CJEU of the balance 
of powers between the EU institutions, in particular with regard to 
the Union’s treaty-making. Arguments are advanced for an alternative 
route based on a dynamic interpretation of the institutional balance 
and of the delegation of powers within the EU.
1. Introduction
European Union agencies (EU agencies) have been set up as tech-
nical bodies engaged in operational functions and supporting decision-
* The author wishes to thank Andrea Ott for valuable comments on previous draft materi-
als upon which this paper is based. Thanks are extended to the anonymous reviewer of 
this paper. The author is solely responsible for all remaining errors. The paper is based on 
ofﬁ cial legal sources available until 22 June 2012. All websites were last accessed on 26 
October 2012.
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making processes in various policy areas, such as aviation, food safety, 
environment, border control activities, police and judicial cooperation, as 
well as human rights.1 The ever expanding external dimension of these 
policy areas in the context of globalisation has prompted EU agencies to 
become active actors at the global level.2 First, in their ﬁ eld of expertise, 
these bodies are increasingly relating to relevant third countries and 
international organisations. Second, EU agencies are getting involved 
together with the Commission and the Council in the daily management 
of the Union’s external relations. In this context, EU agencies are also 
involved in the EU enlargement process wherein they have established 
cooperative relations with candidate and potential candidate countries 
through various partnerships and technical assistance projects. Third, 
candidate and potential candidate countries can participate, in princi-
ple, in the work of EU agencies, while, at the same time, most of these 
bodies are involved in monitoring the implementation of the EU acquis 
by the candidates for EU membership. Such instruments and actions are 
to be seen as part of the wider efforts to prepare candidate and poten-
tial candidate countries for EU membership. In this domain, EU agen-
cies contribute at a technical level to ensuring compatibility between 
EU standards and the standards of the candidate countries in various 
policy areas. They also arguably promote the exportation of EU regula-
tory standards to these countries as part of the acquis.
This paper aims to disentangle and examine from a legal perspec-
tive the different ways in which EU agencies contribute to the enlarge-
ment process, as well as the instruments they use to that effect. For this 
purpose, several steps will be taken. First, a general account of the EU 
agencies’ role, tasks, and their developing international dimension will 
be given as part of the contextual framework for assessing their involve-
ment in the EU enlargement process. Second, the paper will provide an 
overview of the main forms of involvement of the EU agencies in the 
enlargement process. Third, such forms of involvement, together with 
the relevant instruments and activities performed by EU agencies in the 
context of enlargement, will be subjected to a preliminary legal assess-
ment. In this context, the paper will discuss the legal nature of the EU 
agencies’ relevant instruments and some relevant legal problems that 
might arise from the use of some of these instruments from both an EU 
and an international law perspective. Finally, this analysis will focus on 
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) as an example of an agen-
1  See E Vos ‘Reforming the European Commission: What Role to Play for EU Agencies?’ 
(2000) 37 CML Rev 1117-1118.
2  See A Ott, ‘EU Regulatory Agencies in EU External Relations: Trapped in a Legal Mineﬁ eld 
Between European and International Law’ (2008) 13(4) European Foreign Affairs Review 
515.
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cy actively involved in the enlargement process. The paper will reveal 
that, in principle, the EU agencies’ actions and instruments performed 
in the context of enlargement seem legally acceptable under the EU legal 
framework. However, the lack of clarity surrounding the legal nature 
and effects of the EU agencies’ formalised cooperative instruments (such 
as agreements, working arrangements or memoranda of understanding) 
raises concerns in view of the Union’s principles of institutional balance 
and delegation of powers. 
2. EU Agencies as elements of the Union’s institutional framework 
featuring a global proﬁ le
EU agencies have become a well-established and at the same time 
quite a debated component of the institutional structure of the Euro-
pean Union. A signiﬁ cant number of agencies operate at the EU level 
and probably more bodies of a similar nature will be established in the 
near future. The current reality has ﬁ nally been acknowledged by the 
Treaty of Lisbon and, consequently, several references to ‘agencies’ are 
now scattered in the founding treaties.3 However, the founding treaties 
do not include horizontal provisions clarifying the legal status, tasks 
and powers of this category of EU bodies. 
EU agencies have been created over time in miscellaneous areas of 
the Union’s action, using different techniques and based on varied rea-
sons and circumstances.4 While there is no consensus on the deﬁ nition 
and ambit of the category ‘EU agency’,5 for the purpose of this paper, it 
encompasses the so-called ‘regulatory’ or the former ‘Community’ agen-
cies and, after the depillarisation operated by the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
former third pillar agencies.6 Furthermore, there are some ﬂ uctuations 
3  Express references to agencies can be found in arts 15, 16, 263 and 265 TFEU.
4  See Vos (n 1).
5  The Commission acknowledged that, in fact, ‘…there is no single model for a European 
agency…’, but rather several models. See Commission (EC), ‘The operating framework for the 
European Regulatory Agencies’ (Communication) COM (2002) 718 ﬁ nal, 11 December 2002, 
3. In this paper, the terms ‘EU agency’ and ‘European agency’ are used interchangeably.
6  See COM (2002) 718 ﬁ nal (n 5) 4; Commission (EC), ‘Draft Interinstitutional Agreement 
on the operating framework of the European regulatory agencies’ COM (2005) 59 ﬁ nal, 25 
February 2005, 5 and 10-11. On the EU website, the label ‘decentralised agencies’ is cur-
rently used to designate the plethora of specialised EU bodies equipped with their own legal 
personality. See <http://europa.eu/agencies/regulatory_agencies_bodies/index_en.htm>. 
However, for the purpose of this paper, the EU agencies active under the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) are excluded because these bodies continue to operate under a 
rather (different) intergovernmental legal framework. The executive agencies set up on the 
basis of Council Regulation (EC) 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 laying down the statute 
for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community 
programmes [2003] OJ L11/1 also remain outside the realm of this paper because they 
have quite a speciﬁ c legal status in comparison with the ‘regular’ EU agencies.
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between agencies as concerns their formal tasks and powers, as well as 
their internal organisation and operation. This holds true also with re-
gard to the relationships between EU agencies and other actors.7
Nevertheless, some general observations can be made with regard to 
the legal status of EU agencies on the basis of the relevant treaty provi-
sions and policy documents regarding these bodies, their founding acts, 
and the daily institutional and legal practice. Thus, in spite of the existing 
differences, EU agencies seem to have been created mainly as technical 
or administrative components of the Union’s ‘executive branch’.8 Another 
feature of these bodies is that they are provided with some degree of for-
mal autonomy.9 Their formal powers seem to be of a rather similar na-
ture; thus, notwithstanding some exceptions,10 EU agencies are entrusted 
mostly with administrative or technical prerogatives ancillary to decision-
making. Related to this aspect, the principle of institutional balance has 
been advocated as one of the main legal obstacles precluding the Euro-
pean agencies from enjoying more signiﬁ cant formal powers.11 
In practice, EU agencies are engaged in diverse forms of interna-
tional relations with third countries and international organisations.12 
In this context, one might attempt to distinguish several threads as con-
cerns the international cooperation entered into by these bodies.13 First, 
most European agencies are involved in the management of the external 
7  That is, EU institutions, relevant authorities and bodies from the Member States, actors 
outside the EU, stakeholders. See for more details on these issues E Vos, ‘Agencies and the 
European Union’ in L Verhey and T Zwart (eds), Agencies in European and Comparative Per-
spective (Intersentia 2003); E Chiti ‘An Important Part of the EU’s Institutional Machinery: 
Features, Problems and Perspectives of European Agencies’ (2009) 46 CML Rev 1395.
8  See generally on the issue of EU executive power, P Craig ‘European Governance: Execu-
tive and Administrative Powers Under the New Constitutional Settlement’ (2005) 3 (2-3) I 
CON 407; D Curtin ‘Executive Power of the European Union. Law, Practices, and the Living 
Constitution’ in P Alston, G de Búrca, and B de Witte (eds), The Collected Courses of the 
Academy of European Law (volume XII/4, OUP 2009).
9  See M Groenleer, ‘The Autonomy of European Union Agencies: A Comparative Study of 
Institutional Development’ (DPhil thesis, Leiden University 2009) 100-110; and Vos (n 7).
10  For example the Ofﬁ ce for Harmonization of the Internal Market (OHIM), European Avia-
tion Safety Agency (EASA), Community Plant Variety Ofﬁ ce (CPVO), European Chemicals 
Agency (ECHA). More speciﬁ cally, these agencies are entrusted with limited powers to take 
decisions in individual cases: OHIM (registration of trademarks and designs); CPVO (grant 
of plant variety rights); EASA (issuance of certiﬁ cates for aeronautical products); ECHA 
(registration of chemical products). See Commission (EC), ‘European agencies - The way 
forward’ (Communication) COM (2008) 135 ﬁ nal, 7; M Groenleer, ‘The European Commis-
sion and Agencies’ in D Spence (ed), The European Commission (John Harper Publishing 
2006) 165; Chiti (n 7) 1404.
11  See Vos (n 7) 129-131.
12  See Ott (n 2) 518.
13  ibid 528.
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dimension of their respective policy area.14 In particular, it appears that 
these bodies assist with technical and scientiﬁ c support to the Commis-
sion and the Council, as well as to the Member States in their relations 
with international organisations and third countries. In this domain, 
some EU agencies assist the Commission in managing programmes with 
various third countries and also in the enlargement process wherein 
they provide technical assistance to candidate countries.15 Second, it 
14  Such agencies are, for instance, EASA - see Article 27 of Regulation (EC) 216/2008 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the ﬁ eld 
of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council 
Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC [2008] 
OJ L79/1, as last amended by Regulation (EC) 1108/2009 of the European Parliament and 
the Council of 21 October 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 in the ﬁ eld of aero-
dromes, air trafﬁ c management and air navigation services and repealing Directive 2006/23/
EC [2009] OJ L309/51; European Medicines Agency (EMA) - see Articles 28c and 52 of Regu-
lation (EC) 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 laying 
down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products 
for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency [2004] OJ 
L136/1, as last amended by Regulation (EU) 1235/2010 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 15 December 2010 amending, as regards pharmacovigilance of medicinal 
products for human use, Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 laying down Community procedures 
for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use 
and establishing a European Medicines Agency, and Regulation (EC) No 1394/2007 on ad-
vanced therapy medicinal products [2010] OJ L348/1; ECHA - see Article 77 of Regulation 
(EC) 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 con-
cerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), 
establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well 
as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 
93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC [2006] OJ L396/1, as last amended by Commission Regulation 
(EU) 412/2012 of 15 May 2012 amending Annex XVII to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation 
and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) [2012] OJ L128/1; European Fisheries Control Agency 
(EFCA) - see Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) 768/2005 of 26 April 2005 establishing a 
Community Fisheries Control Agency and amending Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 establish-
ing a control system applicable to the common ﬁ sheries policy [2005] OJ L128/1, as amended 
by Council Regulation (EC) 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing a Community con-
trol system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common ﬁ sheries policy, amend-
ing Regulations (EC) No 847/96, (EC) No 2371/2002, (EC) No 811/2004, (EC) No 768/2005, 
(EC) No 2115/2005, (EC) No 2166/2005, (EC) No 388/2006, (EC) No 509/2007, (EC) 
No 676/2007, (EC) No 1098/2007, (EC) No 1300/2008, (EC) No 1342/2008 and repealing 
Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1627/94 and (EC) No 1966/2006 [2009] OJ L343/1; 
Eurojust - see Article 26a of Council Decision 2002/187/ JHA of 28 February 2002 setting 
up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the ﬁ ght against serious crime [2002] OJ L63/1, as 
amended by Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of 
Eurojust and amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforc-
ing the ﬁ ght against serious crime [2009] OJ L138/14; European Police Ofﬁ ce (Europol) - see 
Article 23 of Council Decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing the European 
Police Ofﬁ ce (Europol) [2009] OJ L121/37, etc.
15  For example EASA, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), (Eu-
ropean Food Safety Authority) EFSA, European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), European 
Railway Agency (ERA), ECHA, etc. See, for instance, Commission Implementing Decision of 
18 July 2011 adopting the Multi-beneﬁ ciary Programme under the IPA Transition Assist-
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seems that the European agencies establish direct and autonomous for-
mal and informal relations with third countries and international or-
ganisations.16 Third, it appears that third countries and sometimes also 
international organisations participate in various ways in the work of 
some EU agencies.17 
As concerns the actions and instruments used by the EU agencies 
in their external relations, these range from simple exchanges of infor-
mation, opinions, to memoranda of understanding, administrative ar-
rangements and even agreements concluded with third countries and 
international organisations.18 Various sources19 provide more or less de-
tailed information regarding the international practice of these bodies. 
Similarly, a closer look at the legal framework of the EU agencies re-
veals that in particular the founding acts of these bodies usually include 
provisions regarding cooperation with third countries and internation-
ance and Institution Building Component for the year 2011 - C(2011) 5117 ﬁ nal <http://
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/ﬁ nancial_assistance/ipa/2011/ipa_mbp_2011_c2011_
5117_180711.pdf>.
16  For example EASA, Eurojust, Europol, European Agency for the Management of Opera-
tional Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex), European Union Agency for Funda-
mental Rights (FRA), etc. Thus, in view of their legal framework (in particular, their found-
ing acts) and practice, these agencies conclude in their own name international cooperation 
instruments, such as working arrangements (eg EASA and Frontex), administrative ar-
rangements (eg FRA) memoranda of understanding (eg Europol - see Europol’s press release 
‘Interpol and Europol Agree Joint Initiatives to Enhance Global Response against Transna-
tional Crime’ (12 October 2011)  <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/press/interpol-
and-europol-agree-joint-initiatives-enhance-global-response-against-transnati>), protocols 
(eg FRA - see the Protocol for Cooperation between UNDP and FRA <http://fra.europa.
eu/fraWebsite/attachments/undp-fra-cooperation-agreement_EN.pdf>), and agreements 
(eg Europol, Eurojust, Cepol), and establish informal relations with relevant international 
actors.
17  Such agencies are EASA, European Environment Agency (EEA), European Agency for 
Health and Safety at Work (EU-OSHA), FRA, etc. This is documented inter alia by the EU 
agencies’ founding acts. Thus, in the case of EASA and EEA, the participation of third 
countries in the respective agencies is explicitly stipulated. See Article 66 of Regulation 
216/2008 (n 14) and Article 19 of Regulation (EC) 401/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the European Environment Agency and the Euro-
pean Environment Information and Observation Network [2009] OJ L126/13. As for EU-
OSHA and FRA, provision is made for the participation of both third countries and relevant 
international organisations in the work of these agencies. See Article 9 of Council Regula-
tion (EC) 2062/94 of 18 July 1994 establishing a European Agency for Safety and Health 
at Work [1994] OJ L216/1, as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) 1112/2005 of 
24 June 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 2062/94 establishing a European Agency for 
Safety and Health at Work [2005] OJ L184/5, and Articles 9 and 28 of Council Regulation 
(EC) 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamen-
tal Rights [2007] OJ L53/1.  
18  See Ott (n 2).
19  Such as the EU agencies’ websites, activity reports, annual programmes, evaluation 
reports, policy documents, etc.
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al organisations.20 Sometimes, such provisions are phrased in generic 
terms,21 while in other instances the relevant legal framework is more 
detailed in providing for speciﬁ c international cooperation instruments 
to be used by the respective agency, the procedure for adopting such in-
struments, substantive limitations, and controlling mechanisms.22 The 
founding acts and other relevant legal instruments that are part of the 
EU agencies’ legal framework, and in particular the provisions on inter-
national cooperation, bear special signiﬁ cance. Thus, they are to be seen 
as a source of the EU agencies’ mandate to act on the international plane 
and, at the same time, as a tool for assessing the agencies’ practice of 
international cooperation. 
20  See Ott (n 2) 528-534. There are few exceptions, however, where the founding acts do 
not contain express provisions on international cooperation - ie CPVO, the Translation 
Centre for Bodies of the European Union (CdT), the Body of European Regulators for Elec-
tronic Communications (BEREC), and the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER). ACER is an apparent exception. Thus, Regulation (EU) 1227/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and 
transparency [2011] OJ L326/1, although without formally amending ACER’s founding act, 
extends, nevertheless, the mandate of this agency and, within this extended mandate, it 
provides for international cooperation by this agency (Article 19).
21  Such agencies are: the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Ce-
defop) - see Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) 337/75 of the Council of 10 February 1975 estab-
lishing a European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training [1975] OJ L39/1, as 
amended by Council Regulation (EC) 2051/2004 of 25 October 2004 amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 337/75 establishing a European Centre for the Development of Vocational Train-
ing [2004] OJ L355/; the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) - see 
Article 3 of Regulation (EC) 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 
March 2004 establishing the European Network and Information Security Agency [2004] OJ 
L77/1, as last amended by Regulation (EU) 580/2011 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 8 June 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 establishing the Euro-
pean Network and Information Security Agency as regards its duration [2011] OJ L165/3; 
EU-OSHA - see Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) 2062/94 (n 17); the European Founda-
tion for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (EUROFUND) - see Article 3 of 
Regulation (EEC) 1365/75 of the Council of 26 May 1975 on the creation of a European 
Foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions [1975] OJ L139/1, as last 
amended by Council Regulation (EC) 1111/2005 of 24 June 2005 amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 1365/75 on the creation of a European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions [2005] OJ L184/1, etc.
22  For example the European Police College (Cepol) - see Article 8 of Council Decision 
2005/681/JHA of 20 September 2005 establishing the European Police College (CEPOL) 
and repealing Decision 2000/820/JHA [2005] OJ L256/63; EASA - see Article 27 of Reg-
ulation 218/2008 (n 14); Eurojust - see Articles 26a and 27a-27b of Council Decision 
2002/187/ JHA (n 14); Europol - see Article 23 of Council Decision 2009/371/JHA (n 
14); FRA - see Articles 6, 8-10 of Council Regulation (EC) 168/2007 (n 17); Frontex - see 
Articles 13-14 of Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
of the Member States of the European Union [2004] OJ L349/1, as last amended by Regu-
lation (EU) 1168/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union [2011] OJ L304/1; etc.
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3. EU Agencies and the process of enlargement 
The process of enlargement is based on a very complex and com-
prehensive political, legal and ﬁ nancial framework. This is intended to 
ensure that both the states aspiring to EU membership and the EU itself 
are prepared for the accession of the former and for the post-accession 
phase. For candidate23 and potential candidate countries,24 accession to 
the European Union entails a gradual transformation of their political 
and institutional systems, as well as the adoption and implementation 
of the relevant acquis.25 The enlargement process requires permanent 
assistance and support from the Union to enable the countries aspir-
ing to membership to meet the EU standards.26 It also entails a con-
tinuous monitoring process ensuring that each relevant country meets 
the conditions for accession.27 With regard speciﬁ cally to the Western 
Balkan countries, for instance, the process of enlargement, also known 
as the ‘Stabilisation and Association Process’, comprises the following 
milestones: a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between each 
country and the EU; Accession or European Partnerships identifying in 
detail the duties of each country in terms of the acquis; Action Plans, as 
pragmatic instruments intended to ensure that the objectives set in the 
Accession Partnerships are met and to allow for close scrutiny.28 For the 
23  Iceland, Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, and Turkey, 
according to the information available on the ofﬁ cial website of the European Commission 
in the section ‘Enlargement’ <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/check-current-
status/index_en.htm> last updated 26 October 2012. As from December 2011, Croatia 
is an acceding country. See, for instance, the European Commission’s information note 
‘Signature of the Accession Treaty of the European Union (EU) with Croatia: Background 
Note’ (MEMO/11/883, 9 December 2011) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
11-883_en.htm>. 
24  Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo (under UNSC Resolution 1244/99). See, 
for instance, the information available on the ofﬁ cial website of the European Commission 
in the section ‘Enlargement’ <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/check-current-
status/index_en.htm> last updated 26 October 2012.
25  See M Maresceau ‘Pre-accession’ in M Cremona (ed) The Enlargement of the European 
Union (Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, volume XII/1, OUP 2003).
26  See MA Vachudova ‘Strategies for Democratisation and European Integration in the 
Balkans’ in Cremona (n 25).
27  See P Nicolaides ‘Preparing for Accession to the European Union: How to Establish Ca-
pacity for Effective and Credible Application of EU Rules’ in Cremona (n 25).
28  See European Commission ‘Understanding Enlargement. The European Union’s Enlarge-
ment Policy’ (2011) 9-13 <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/publication/20110725_
understanding_enlargement_en.pdf>. For a detailed illustration of how this process works 
in practice, see Commission (EC), ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012’ 
(Communication) COM (2011) 666 ﬁ nal. See also J Marko and J Wilhelm ‘Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements’ in A Ott and K Inglis (eds), Handbook on European Enlargement 
(TMC Asser Press 2002) and M Spernbauer ‘Benchmarking, Safeguard Clauses and Veri-
ﬁ cation Mechanisms: What’s in a Name? Recent Developments in Pre- and Post-Accession 
Conditionality and Compliance with EU law’ (2007) 3 CYELP 292-294.
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whole of this process until the moment of accession, candidate countries 
are subjected to a monitoring process materialised inter alia in regular 
progress reports and strategy papers.29 
Beside its political signiﬁ cance, the process of enlargement includes 
a technical dimension. The latter becomes visible in particular in the 
process of assisting candidate countries to meet detailed standards un-
der various chapters of the acquis. It is also present in the process of 
monitoring the fulﬁ lment of speciﬁ c acquis duties and benchmarks by 
such countries.30 The European Commission is the main actor man-
aging the accession process both in its political and technical dimen-
sions.31 In this context, the Commission manages and implements vari-
ous programmes and ﬁ nancial instruments in order to assist candidate 
and potential candidate countries on their way to EU membership.32 It is 
also responsible for the screening and monitoring of these countries, as 
well as for the required corrective measures.33 
The EU agencies’ involvement in the enlargement process is depend-
ent on their position within the Union’s institutional framework, on their 
role and tasks, as well as on the features of their respective policy area. 
Accordingly, EU agencies as auxiliary technical and administrative bod-
ies would normally perform various tasks and activities of a technical 
nature in relation to candidate and potential candidate countries. These 
may include various forms of assistance with regard to the EU acquis, 
familiarising candidate and potential candidate countries about the way 
in which the Union’s institutional and regulatory framework works, set-
ting-up various forms of cooperation with the competent authorities from 
the relevant countries, monitoring and inspection tasks, etc. Below, an 
overview of some of the main modes in which EU agencies participate 
in the process of enlargement is presented to offer more concrete insight 
into the nature and breadth of their involvement.
One important form of involvement of EU agencies in the enlarge-
ment process consists of the participation of candidate and potential 
candidate countries in the work of these bodies. In this sense, it should 
29  See, for instance, European Commission ‘Understanding Enlargement’ (n 28); numerous 
progress reports and enlargement strategies are available for consultation on the ofﬁ cial 
website of the European Commission, in the section dedicated to ‘Enlargement’ <http://
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_en.htm> last 
updated 22 October 2012. See also C Hillion ‘The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny’ 
in C Hillion (ed), EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach (Hart Publishing 2004) 13-14.
30  See Nicolaides (n 27).
31  Spernbauer (n 28) 293.
32  See, for instance, Commission (EC), ‘Preparing for the participation of the Western Balkan 
countries in Community programmes and agencies’ (Communication) COM (2003) 748 ﬁ nal.
33  See Spernbauer (n 28) 293-297.
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be pointed out that the founding acts of some EU agencies provide spe-
ciﬁ cally for the involvement of candidates for EU membership in the par-
ticular agency.34 In other cases, the founding acts refer generally to the 
possibility of third countries participating in the agency.35 The founding 
acts often make effective participation in the relevant agency conditional 
upon the conclusion of agreements between the respective third countries 
and the EU, which are to include detailed rules for such participation.36 
34  For example BEREC - Article 4 of Regulation (EC) 1211/2009 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 25 November 2009 establishing the Body of European Regula-
tors for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Ofﬁ ce [2009] OJ L337/1; European 
Asylum Support Ofﬁ ce (EASO) - Article 49 of Regulation (EU) 439/2010 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Of-
ﬁ ce [2010] OJ 2010 L132/11 - with regard to Iceland; FRA - Article 28 of Council Regulation 
(EC) 168/2007 (n 17), referring speciﬁ cally to the participation in the agency of candidate 
countries and countries with whom a Stabilisation and Association Agreement has been 
concluded.
35  For example ACER - Article 31 of Regulation (EC) 713/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators [2009] OJ L211/1; ECDC - Article 30 of Regulation (EC) 851/2004 of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 establishing a European Centre 
for disease prevention and control [2004] OJ L142/1; European Banking Authority (EBA) 
- Article 75 of Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Au-
thority) [2010] OJ L331/12; ECHA - Article 106 of Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 (n 14); EEA 
- see Articles 8 and 19 of Regulation (EC) 401/2009 (n 17); EFSA - Article 49 of Regulation 
(EC) 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying 
down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food 
Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety [2002] OJ L31/1, as 
last amended by Regulation (EC) 596/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 18 June 2009 adapting a number of instruments subject to the procedure referred to in 
Article 251 of the Treaty to Council Decision 1999/468/EC with regard to the regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny [2009] OJ L188/14; European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) 
- Article 19 of Regulation (EC) 1922/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 20 December 2006 on establishing a European Institute for Gender Equality [2006] OJ 
L403/1; European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) - Article 21 
of Regulation (EC) 1920/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Decem-
ber 2006 on the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (recast) [2006] 
OJ L376/1; European Training Foundation (ETF) - Article 23 of Regulation (EC) 1339/2008 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 establishing a Euro-
pean Training Foundation (recast) [2008] OJ L354/82.
36  For example ACER - Article 31 of Regulation (EC) 713/2009 (n 35); EBA - Article 75 of 
Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 (n 35); ECDC - Article 30 of Regulation (EC) 851/2004 (n 35); 
ECHA - Article 106 of Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 (n 14); EEA - Article 19 of Regulation (EC) 
401/2009 (n 17); EFSA - Article 49 of Regulation (EC) 178/2002 (n 35); EIGE - Article 19 
of Regulation (EC) 1922/2006 (n 35); EMCDDA - Article 21 of Regulation (EC) 1920/2006 
(n 35); ETF - Article 23 of Regulation (EC) 1339/2008 (n 35). This reality seems to match 
the Commission’s view regarding the participation of candidate countries in individual EU 
agencies which proposes the conclusion of bilateral legal instruments for deﬁ ning the de-
tails of such participation. See Commission (EC), ‘Participation of candidate countries in 
Community programmes, agencies and committees’ (Communication) COM (99) 710, 20 
December 1999, 9. In this context, however, a two-step approach has been proposed: 1. 
establish cooperation with the candidates for EU accession within the framework of EU rel-
evant programmes in order to familiarise them with agencies’ work; 2. conclude agreements 
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Participation of candidates and potential candidates in EU agencies may 
entail various forms, encompassing ‘formative and informative’ participa-
tion (seminars, joint working parties, special meetings after the meeting 
of the Management Board, etc), as well as participation in the manage-
ment board of the agencies.37 Such participation is seen as a ‘fundamental 
step’ in ensuring the required familiarisation with the acquis.38 Hence, 
the Commission’s suggestion that all candidates and potential candidates 
should participate in the work of all EU agencies before accession.39 
In practice, one of the most obvious forms of involvement of candi-
date and potential candidate countries in EU agencies is participation 
in management boards. Two observations can be made with regard to 
this aspect. First, in spite of the rather similar provisions on third coun-
try participation in the founding acts of the EU agencies, the reality 
reveals a different picture.40 Thus, in many EU agencies, the participa-
tion of candidate and potential candidate countries in the management 
board is not ofﬁ cially activated or is only partially activated. This is the 
case for EFSA41 and the European Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(EMCDDA),42 whose management boards do not appear ofﬁ cially to in-
clude representatives of candidates for EU accession. On the other hand, 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)43 and 
the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders (Frontex)44 include only Iceland on the board, the 
regarding the involvement of candidates for EU accession in the work of individual agencies. 
See COM (2003) 748 (n 32) 10. 
37  COM (99) 710 (n 36) 9 and COM (2003) 748 (n 32) 9.
38  COM (99) 710 (n 36) 8.
39  ibid 9.
40  For more details regarding the reality of participation in EU agencies and the potential 
for the involvement of candidates for EU accession in individual agencies, see COM (99) 
710 (n 36) 9 and COM (2003) 748 (n 32) 9. See also A Evans ‘Institutions’ in Ott and Inglis 
(n 28) 1067.
41  See composition of the management board, European Food Safety Agency <http://www.
efsa.europa.eu/en/mb/mbmembers.htm>.
42  See EMCDDA’s General Report of Activities 2011, 83-84 <http://www.emcdda.europa.
eu/publications/general-report-of-activities/2011>. See also European Monitoring Centre 
for Drugs and Drug Addiction <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/about/mb>.
43  See ECDC’s Annual Report of the Director 2011, 58-59
<http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/aboutus/Key%20Documents/1205-COR-Annual-report-
Director-2011.pdf >.
See also the composition of the management board, European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control <http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/aboutus/organisation/mb/Pages/AboutUs_
Organisation_ManagementBoard.aspx>.
44  See Frontex General Report 2010, 32-34 
<http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_re-
port/2010/frontex_general_report_2010.pdf>. See also Frontex General Report 2011, 37-40
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European Training Foundation (ETF)45 has only Turkey on the govern-
ing board, while the management board of the European Environment 
Agency (EEA)46 includes only representatives of Iceland and Turkey. Sec-
ond, when they participate in EU agencies, the representatives of these 
countries are usually given observer status, implying no voting rights on 
the board.47 Frontex might be an exception as it includes Iceland in the 
category of ‘representatives of the management board’, which is different 
from the status of ‘invited participants’ to the meetings of the board.48 
An interesting situation concerns Turkey’s participation in EMCDDA, 
based on an agreement concluded with the EU (not ratiﬁ ed yet).49 For 
the time being, it appears that Turkey’s representative is participating as 
an observer at the heads of national focal point meetings.50 Finally, one 
should note that after signing the accession treaty, a candidate country 
acquires the status of ‘acceding state’. Such a status entails, inter alia, 
becoming an ‘active observer’ in EU bodies and agencies, implying the 
right to speak, but not to participate in the adoption of the ﬁ nal decisions 
of the respective body or agency.51
A somewhat different dimension to the participation of potential 
candidate and candidate countries in EU agencies is furthered via sup-
port actions within the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 
<http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_
report/2011/General_Report_2011.pdf>.
45  See the composition of the governing board, European Training Foundation <http://etf.
europa.eu/web.nsf/pages/Governing_board_members_EN>.
46  See EEA’s Annual Report 2011 and Environmental Statement 2012, 77-78
<http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/annual-report-2011>. See also the composition 
of the management board, European Environment Agency <http://www.eea.europa.eu/
about-us/governance/management-board/list-of-management-board-members>.
47  For example BEREC, EEA, ECDC, ETF.
48  This distinction was made in the Frontex General Report 2010 (n 44) 34. See also A Ott 
‘Turkey’s Status in EU Institutions and Policies: Living in Sin or Living Separate Lives’ in H 
Kabaalioglu, A Ott and A Tatham (eds), EU and Turkey: Bridging the Differences (Economic 
Development Foundation 2011) 133. It should be noted that such a delineation in the Fron-
tex General Report 2011 is not formally operated anymore.
49  The agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Turkey on the 
participation of the Republic of Turkey in the work of the EMCDDA [2007] OJ L323/24 
was ofﬁ cially signed by both parties on 30 October 2007 according to the section on part-
nerships with candidate and potential candidate countries on the ofﬁ cial website of the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction <http://www.emcdda.europa.
eu/about/partners/cc#albania> last updated 4 September. See also Ott (n 48) 132.
50  According to the section on partnerships with candidate and potential candidate coun-
tries on the ofﬁ cial website of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addic-
tion <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/about/partners/cc> last updated 4 September 2012, 
and Turkey’s country page available on the same website <http://www.emcdda.europa.
eu/countries/turkey> last updated 24 September 2012.
51  See European Commission ‘Understanding Enlargement’ (n 28) 13. 
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framework. In this context, the Commission manages inter alia projects 
on participation in EU agencies, entailing grants to these bodies in order 
for them to carry out various measures meant to facilitate the future 
participation of candidates for EU accession.52 However, such actions 
performed by EU agencies are also part of the next form of involvement 
of these bodies in the enlargement process - ie technical assistance to 
candidate and potential candidate countries. 
Another form of involvement of EU agencies in the enlargement proc-
ess consists broadly of technical assistance and support actions in order 
to familiarise candidate and potential candidate countries with the EU 
acquis.53 Such assistance and support is provided by EU agencies un-
der more or less formalised frameworks. An example of a more informal 
framework for cooperation with (the competent authorities of) candidates 
and potential candidates involving EU agencies and their staff is the 
Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX).54 
In this context, assistance in the transposition and enforcement of EU 
legislation is provided inter alia in the form of workshops, seminars, and 
training.55 Technical assistance and preparatory measures are or have 
been carried out by EU agencies also within more formalised techni-
cal and ﬁ nancial instruments encompassing until now several EU pro-
grammes under the Programme of Community Aid to the Countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (PHARE),56 Community Assistance for Re-
construction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS)57 and IPA. An il-
lustrative example is the IPA Multi-beneﬁ ciary programme on preparato-
ry measures for the participation of candidate and potential candidates 
in EU agencies ﬁ rst adopted in 2007, then again in 2009 and extended 
52  See, for instance, Commission Implementing Decision of 18 July 2011 adopting the 
Multi-beneﬁ ciary Programme under the IPA Transition Assistance and Institution Build-
ing Component for the year 2011, C(2011) 5117 ﬁ nal (n 15) and, in particular, the Annex 
‘Multi-beneﬁ ciary Programme under the IPA Transition Assistance and Institution Building 
Component for the year 2011’. 
53  See Commission Implementing Decision of 18 July 2011 adopting the Multi-beneﬁ ciary 
Programme under the IPA Transition Assistance and Institution Building Component for 
the year 2011 (n 15), Project Fiche No 14 ‘Participation in EU Agencies’ 2
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/ﬁ nancial_assistance/ipa/2011/pf_14_ipa_2011_
participation_in_eu_agencies.pdf>.
54  See, for instance, TAIEX Activity Report 2011 <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/
taiex/11216_taiex_2011_en.pdf>. See also the information available on TAIEX on the of-
ﬁ cial website of the European Commission <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/tenders/
taiex/index_en.htm> last updated 24 September 2012.
55   See, for instance, TAIEX Activity Report 2011 <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/
taiex/11216_taiex_2011_en.pdf>. See also the information available on TAIEX on the of-
ﬁ cial website of the European Commission <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/tenders/
taiex/index_en.htm> last updated 24 September 2012.
56  See COM (99) 710 (n 36).
57  See COM (2003) 748 ﬁ nal (n 32).
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in 2011.58 Such preparatory measures performed by EU agencies include 
providing advice on organisational matters, training the appropriate 
staff of candidates and potential candidates, as well as participation in 
speciﬁ c events. To that effect, each EU agency59 involved in the project is 
awarded a grant by the Commission in order to organise and implement 
the required actions (ie training activities, study visits, workshops, con-
ferences, outreach actions, etc).60 According to the Annex and the Project 
Fiche attached to the Commission’s implementing decision, it becomes 
apparent that the Commission takes the relevant decisions (including 
those with ﬁ nancial implications) with regard to the projects carried out 
by the relevant EU agencies.61 On behalf of the beneﬁ ciaries, EU agencies 
contribute to the project description in cooperation with the beneﬁ ciar-
ies, subject to the Commission’s authorisation, and then implement the 
technical and support activities deﬁ ned in those projects.62 
A different form of participation in the enlargement process entails 
the involvement of EU agencies in the so-called ‘benchmarking’ of can-
didate and potential candidate countries.63 In this context, it transpires 
that most EU agencies are engaged in the monitoring of the implementa-
tion and enforcement of the EU acquis in their relevant policy areas.64 
Such inspection and monitoring tasks performed by EU agencies are 
usually materialised in reports that are forwarded to the Commission. 
The ﬁ ndings of the EU agencies concerning alignment and compliance 
by candidates and potential candidates with the relevant EU standards 
in various policy sectors are eventually reﬂ ected or incorporated in the 
general progress reports and enlargement strategies issued regularly by 
the Commission.65 
58  See Project Fiche No 14 (n 53) 3-5.
59  The programme focuses on thirteen EU agencies (CPVO; EASA; ECDC; ECHA; EEA; 
EFSA; EMCDDA; EMSA; ERA; EU-OSHA; EUROFOUND; EMEA; EIGE). See Annex to Com-
mission Implementing Decision of 18 July 2011 adopting the Multi-beneﬁ ciary Programme 
under the IPA Transition Assistance and Institution Building Component for the year 2011 
(n 52) 10, as well as Project Fiche No 14 (n 53) 4.
60  See, for an example, ECDC’s Annual Report of the Director 2010, 32
<http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/aboutus/Key%20Documents/1106_COR_Annual_Report_Di-
rector_2010.pdf>.
61  See Project Fiche No 14 (n 53) 5.
62  See Project Fiche No 14 (n 53) 5. See, for an example of such a project implemented by 
EMCDDA <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index151216EN.html> last updated 
18 September 2012.
63  See on the use of this term in the context of EU enlargement, Spernbauer (n 28) 281-
283.
64  See Project Fiche No 14 (n 53) 5.
65  See, for instance, Commission (EC) ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 Progress Report ac-
companying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011’ COM (2010) 660 ﬁ nal 
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Yet another category of the EU agencies’ actions relevant for the en-
largement process consists of formalised cooperation instruments con-
cluded by these bodies with candidate and potential candidates or with 
their competent authorities. Such instruments may bear different labels66 
and they lay down a more general or speciﬁ c framework for working re-
lations between EU agencies and the countries aspiring to EU member-
ship. Frontex, for instance, has concluded working arrangements with 
(the competent authorities of) Croatia, Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
signed recently a memorandum of understanding with Turkey.67 In ad-
dition, Europol has an impressive record of operational and strategic 
agreements with all candidate and potential candidate countries, except 
for Kosovo.68 It should be noted that such formal arrangements could 
be conceived primarily as an instrument for the enlargement policy or, 
conversely, as an instrument aimed at promoting the external dimen-
sion of the sectoral policy that comes within the mandate of the agency, 
or both at the same time. In any case, such instruments are relevant in 
the enlargement process as they serve as yardsticks for assessing the 
progress made by each candidate and potential candidate with regard 
to speciﬁ c chapters of the acquis. Such formalised instruments might 
mark a consolidated phase in cooperation between EU agencies and the 
countries aspiring to EU membership, illustrating advanced alignment 
with EU standards.
4.  EU Agencies’ involvement in the enlargement process 
 - a preliminary legal assessment
4.1. Legal yardsticks 
A legal assessment of the EU agencies’ involvement in the enlarge-
ment process requires examining the legal nature of their various forms 
of participation and evaluating such participation against relevant legal 
(Commission Staff Working Document) SEC (2010) 1331 ﬁ nal <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2010:1331:FIN:EN:PDF>. This progress report includes 
information on developments regarding cooperation with Frontex (54). It also touches upon 
the way in which institutional cooperation with EMCDDA is progressing, and refers speciﬁ -
cally to the information collection process as being in line with EMCDDA standards (57).
66  Such as ‘working arrangements’ (eg Frontex - see Article 14 of the Frontex founding 
regulation) or ‘agreements’ (eg Europol - see Article 23 of the Europol founding decision, 
and Eurojust - see Article 26a of Eurojust founding decision).
67  The memorandum of understanding between Frontex and Turkey was signed on 28 
May 2012, according to the newsletter available on Frontex’s ofﬁ cial website <http://www.
frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-signs-a-memorandum-of-understanding-with-turkey-
iY5Euj>.
68  Europol <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/international-relations-31>.
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principles and standards. Within the Union context, the main yardsticks 
against which the EU agencies’ performance should be assessed are the 
principle of institutional balance, as well as the doctrine of delegation/
conferment of powers.69 This is because over time one of the most trou-
blesome issues has been the delegation or attribution of powers to EU 
agencies stemming from apparent fears not to disturb the Union’s insti-
tutional balance.70 The assessment of EU agencies in view of these stand-
ards requires, on the one hand, establishing the nature and breadth of 
the powers that can be entrusted to EU agencies and, on the other hand, 
examining whether the EU agencies’ activities and instruments remain 
within the scope of the mandate assigned to them.
The principle of institutional balance is rather aimed at a system 
of checks and balances in which the prerogatives of the EU institutions 
are guaranteed.71 The balance of powers does not imply an equal alloca-
tion of powers between the institutions, since this may vary signiﬁ cantly 
across policy areas and it changes over time.72 According to Majone, in-
stitutional balance requires ‘that each institution: 1. has the necessary 
independence in exercising its powers; 2. must respect the powers of the 
other institutions; 3. may not unconditionally assign its powers to other 
institutions and bodies’.73 In particular, the third observation made by 
Majone illustrates the relevance of the principle of institutional balance 
as regards the issue of delegation/conferment of powers to other bodies. 
Because ‘delegation of powers’ is not deﬁ ned in the Treaties, there 
is room for various interpretations of this concept, some narrower and 
some broader, leading to several ‘delegation of power’ scenarios within 
the EU.74 In one such scenario, an institution vested with certain powers 
69  Also known as the Meroni doctrine after the Meroni cases (Case 9/56 Meroni & Co, In-
dustrie Metallurgiche SpA v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community [1958] 
ECR 133 and Case 10/56 Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche SpA v High Authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community [1958] ECR 157) where issues of the delegation of 
powers and institutional balance were famously tackled by the Court of Justice. See also S 
Griller and A Orator ‘Meroni Revisited: Empowering European Agencies between Efﬁ ciency 
and Legitimacy’ (2007) NewGov 04/D40 <http://www.eu-newgov.org/database/DELIV/
D04D40_WP_Meroni_Revisited.pdf >.
70  See Vos (n 7) 129-131.
71  S Prechal, ‘Institutional Balance: A Fragile Principle with Uncertain Contents’ in T 
Heukel, N Blokker, and M Brus (eds), The European Union after Amsterdam. A Legal Analy-
sis (Kluwer Law International 1998) 280.
72  G Majone, ‘Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity’ (2002) 8(3) European Law 
Journal 326; Prechal (n 71) 276.
73  Majone (n 72) 327.
74  See on this K Lenaerts ‘Regulating the Regulatory Process: “Delegation of Powers” in the 
European Community’ (1993) 18(1) EL Rev 23-49.
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transfers some of its prerogatives to another EU institution.75 In another 
scenario, powers are delegated by an institution to third parties.76 This 
particular scenario was at the origin of the Meroni doctrine established 
by the Court at the end of the 1950s. In the Meroni cases,77 the Court ac-
cepted, in principle, that EU institutions can delegate to external bodies 
executive powers that they themselves possess according to the Treaties, 
but only if such powers are ‘clearly deﬁ ned’ and subject to their super-
vision.78 In yet another scenario, ‘delegation’ is understood in a broad 
sense whereby certain powers and tasks are entrusted to or conferred on 
other bodies by an institution (ie the legislator) which normally does not 
itself exercise such powers. In such a case, this is rather a conferment of 
powers on EU agencies than a ‘mere’ delegation of tasks.
Allegedly, the second and third ‘delegation of powers’ scenarios are 
relevant for EU agencies. The second scenario, entailing a typical delega-
tion of powers, is apposite for EU agencies within the legal framework 
laid down by their founding acts. In this context, the Commission, in 
particular, delegates certain implementing tasks to EU agencies.79 Such 
delegation will abide by the standard Meroni requirements, as established 
in the CJEU case law. The third scenario is arguably applicable to EU 
‘regulatory’ or ‘decentralised’ agencies since they are set up by legisla-
tive acts conferring on them certain (administrative) powers.80 One may 
wonder whether the delegation logic set by the CJEU in Meroni would 
apply mutatis mutandis in this particular context or whether conferring 
some powers becomes instead a matter of competence and ultimately 
an issue of institutional balance.81 By extrapolating the Meroni logic to 
this particular context, it can be maintained that the powers and tasks 
conferred on EU agencies do not affect the principle of institutional bal-
ance as long as such powers: 1. are sufﬁ ciently deﬁ ned and do not entail 
75  See Lenaerts (n 74) 25-36.
76  Part or not of the Union’s institutional framework.
77  Case 9/56 Meroni (n 69) 150-152 and Case 10/56 Meroni (n 69) 173. For an analysis, see 
E Vos, Institutional Frameworks of Community Health and Safety Legislation. Committees, 
Agencies and Private Bodies (Hart Publishing 1999) 201.
78  See Case 9/56 Meroni (n 69) 150-152.
79  For example, tasks are delegated to EU agencies in the context of the implementation of 
various EU programmes and in line with the EU Financial Regulation. See Council Regula-
tion (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to 
the general budget of the European Communities [2002] OJ L248/1 with the latest amend-
ments, as well as Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) 2342/2002 of 23 December 2002 
laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European 
Communities [2002] OJ L357/1 with the latest amendments.
80  See on this Griller and Orator (n 69).
81  See Lenaerts (n 74) 43; Vos (n 77) 203; Vos (n 7) 131-132.
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a signiﬁ cant degree of (political) discretion; 2. do not encroach upon the 
powers conferred by the founding treaties on EU institutions; 3. are sub-
jected to sufﬁ cient supervision and controlling mechanisms.82 This test 
requires a close examination of the mandate of the EU agencies and of 
the accountability and control mechanisms designed by the founding 
acts and other relevant instruments. In performing this analysis, ques-
tions of compatibility with the EU founding treaties can occasionally be 
raised with regard to some of the powers bestowed on some agencies83 
or in instances where the prerogatives of agencies are phrased in gen-
eral and vague terms. In particular in the later case, one may wonder 
whether such prerogatives are sufﬁ ciently deﬁ ned and would not entail a 
signiﬁ cant degree of discretion on behalf of the EU agencies. 
Along with this test, it should be further investigated whether the 
EU agencies’ actions and instruments remain within the realm of their 
mandate as established by their legal framework. This aspect could be-
come particularly problematic when EU agencies exercise prerogatives 
that are stipulated in broad terms in their founding acts or when, in 
practice, these bodies perform actions and use speciﬁ c instruments that 
are not explicitly provided for by their legal framework. However, from 
a functional perspective, such actions and instruments should remain, 
in principle, within the mandate of the agency as long as they are per-
formed with a view to attaining the agency’s mission and objectives. This 
approach would reﬂ ect an ERTA-type of reasoning whereby agencies’ in-
ternational cooperation prerogatives and instruments would be derived 
by way of necessary implication from their objectives and functions.84 
4.2. Assessing EU agencies’ involvement in the enlargement 
process against the legal yardsticks
The issue of the participation of candidate and potential candidate 
countries in EU agencies does not seem at ﬁ rst sight to raise difﬁ culties 
in terms of institutional balance. As already mentioned, for most EU 
agencies the founding acts include explicit provisions on the participa-
tion of third countries in the work of these bodies. Furthermore, such 
participation is often dependent on agreements concluded between the 
EU and the third country concerned specifying the scope and conditions 
of third country involvement in the agency or allowing for detailed ar-
82  See Majone (n 72) 331; Vos (n 1) 1123. See also Griller and Orator (n 69).
83  For example the prerogative of Europol, Eurojust, and Cepol to conclude agreements 
with third countries and international organisations conferred explicitly on these bodies by 
their founding acts.
84  Cf Case 22/70 Commission v Council (European Agreement on Road Transport) [1971] 
ECR 263.
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rangements to be made to that effect.85 This suggests that EU agencies’ 
respective tasks do not normally entail an excessive degree of discretion, 
nor do they encroach upon the powers of EU institutions, while their ac-
tions performed with a view to ensuring the participation of candidates 
and potential candidates are within the realm of their mandate. 
However, the participation of candidate and potential candidate 
countries in the decision-making bodies of EU agencies, in particular 
in the management board, might seem problematic. This issue might 
arise under the standards set by the CJEU in the Opinions on the EEA 
agreement86 with regard to the participation of third countries in the de-
cision-making of the Union’s supranational institutions.87 In those Opin-
ions, the Court stated the principle according to which it is possible to 
make arrangements by virtue of an agreement as to the sharing of the 
respective competences of the EU and third countries in a certain area, 
but only as far as such arrangements do not change the nature of the 
powers of EU institutions.88 One of the consequences derived from this 
principle is that third countries cannot participate in the decision-mak-
ing of EU institutions89 where the outcome of the process would bear a 
different legal weight for the third country concerned as compared with 
the EU system.90 This would actually amount to changing the nature of 
the powers of the Union’s institutions.
Nevertheless, these concerns can be alleviated by the following two 
arguments. First, EU agencies are not part of the main EU suprana-
tional institutional framework, but separate bodies with very limited de-
cision-making powers.91 This is relevant because a distinction may be 
made between the main EU institutions in which participation of third 
countries is, in principle, excluded and the other elements of the Union’s 
institutional framework (including agencies) where participation seems 
to be allowed in practice.92 Second, candidate and potential candidates 
85  See Ott (n 48) 132.
86  Opinion 1/91 Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the coun-
tries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the 
European Economic Area [1991] ECR I-6079 and Opinion 1/92 Draft agreement between 
the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Associa-
tion, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area [1992] ECR I-
2821.
87  Ott (n 48) 130.
88  Opinion 1/92 (n 86) para 6.
89  Ott (n 48) 130.
90  For example, a decision issued by the respective EU institution binding within the EU, 
but not for the third county concerned.
91  Ott (n 48) 131-132.
92  ibid.
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involved in the board of EU agencies normally have a limited status, ex-
cluding participation in the adoption of ﬁ nal decisions.93
Looking at the participation of candidates and potential candidates 
in EU agencies in the broad sense - ie in the form of technical assist-
ance and projects carried out by the latter in the framework of EU pro-
grammes - it appears that the principle of institutional balance is not 
breached. First, because such technical assistance and projects reﬂ ect a 
rather classical Meroni scenario involving delegation from the Commis-
sion to EU agencies under EU Financial regulations.94 In this context, 
the Commission (DG Enlargement) deﬁ nes, ﬁ nances, and supervises the 
project, while EU agencies only carry out the required implementing ac-
tions. Second, because such technical assistance is carried out by EU 
agencies in view of their expertise and, therefore, it is normally conﬁ ned 
to their respective mandate as deﬁ ned by their respective founding acts. 
Third, because such technical assistance usually does not materialise 
in legally binding instruments, but in rather informal actions or soft 
law instruments which are not perceived as encroaching upon the pow-
ers of EU institutions or causing other signiﬁ cant legal problems. This 
conclusion also applies to other technical assistance activities carried 
out on an ad hoc basis or in informal settings such as various networks, 
provided that such assistance falls within the mandate of the respective 
agency, as deﬁ ned by its relevant legal framework.
Likewise, the involvement of EU agencies in the monitoring process 
of candidate and potential candidate countries does not seem legally 
problematic. Thus, the Commission involves the EU agencies in the mon-
itoring process by establishing their precise role and ensuring oversight 
over their actions. Furthermore, such inspection and monitoring tasks 
come within the mandate of these bodies via their founding acts or in 
the framework of the agreements concluded between the Union and the 
candidate and potential candidate countries with a view to their acces-
sion. Finally, the monitoring activities performed by EU agencies do not 
entail direct legal consequences as such. They result in reports that are 
forwarded to the Commission; it is then up to the Commission to take 
the necessary actions, including legally binding decisions.
Conversely, the formalised cooperation instruments concluded by 
some EU agencies with candidate and potential candidate countries en-
tail international law implications and raise difﬁ culties in terms of the 
93  ibid 133.
94  See Article 13 (4) of Council Regulation (EC) 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing an 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) [2006] OJ L210/82 with the latest amend-
ments, as well as Article 54 (2) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002 (n 79).
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principle of institutional balance.95 The reason for this is that the agree-
ments or arrangements concluded by some EU agencies might turn out 
to be legally binding agreements or, otherwise, entail some legal con-
sequences under international law.96 This triggers two important legal 
questions. First, how can one determine the legal nature and effects of 
the formalised international cooperation instruments concluded by EU 
agencies? Second, is it permissible to entrust these bodies with such pre-
rogatives under the current EU legal and institutional framework? 
Regarding the legal nature of such formalised cooperation instru-
ments, no general conclusions can be drawn.97 Instead, a case-by-case 
analysis on the basis of relevant criteria needs to be performed for each 
instrument or category of instruments concluded by each EU agency. 
Such criteria include the wording and substance of the instrument, as 
well as the particular circumstances (context) in which the instrument 
has been negotiated, concluded and implemented.98 While the agree-
ments concluded by Europol could arguably be qualiﬁ ed as binding in-
ternational agreements, a different conclusion seems to apply in the case 
of Frontex, whose working arrangements specify that they are not to be 
considered as international treaties.99 However, even if such agreements 
or arrangements can be qualiﬁ ed as ‘nonbinding’ or ‘soft law instru-
ments’, they might still entail some legal effects in international law.100 
Based on the assumption that such agreements, even if not legally bind-
ing, might contain, nevertheless, ‘undertakings taken seriously’ by the 
parties,101 it follows that they might trigger the application of the es-
toppel principle (based on ‘expectations of continued observance by the 
parties’).102 In this context, one should add that soft law instruments are 
95  See Ott (n 2).
96  On the issue of the legal effects that non-binding agreements could entail, see O Sch-
achter, ‘The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements’ (1977) 71(2) Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 303.
97  Ott (n 2) 535-538.
98  At least, this is the position of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Maritime Delimi-
tation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994, 112 and Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 
1978, 3. See also Schachter (n 96) 297; HG Schermers and NM Blokker, International Insti-
tutional Law. Unity Within Diversity (4th rev edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003) 1112-
1113. It should be added that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) took a 
similar view on this matter. See Case C-233/02 France v Commission [2004] ECR I-2759, 
para 40; Case C-327/1991 France v Commission [1994] ECR I-3641, para 15.
99  Ott (n 2) 535-536. See also Ott (n 48) 133.
100  Schachter (n 96) 303. Furthermore, the mere fact that such instruments have a soft law 
or non-binding nature does not necessarily imply that EU agencies are always competent to 
adopt them. See Case C-233/02 France v Commission (n 98) para 40.
101  Schachter (n 96) 303.
102  ibid 304.
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said to be legally relevant, in particular when they contain (administra-
tive) ‘rules and technical standards’ for the implementation of treaties 
and other binding international instruments.103 
As regards the issue of whether EU agencies can actually use such 
international cooperation instruments according to EU law, the following 
preliminary observations can be advanced. Thus, one may argue that, 
even in the absence of an express provision to that effect in the founding 
treaties, these bodies could, in principle, be equipped with such (func-
tional) external powers via their founding acts and other secondary law 
instruments.104 This is legally acceptable provided that such prerogatives 
are sufﬁ ciently deﬁ ned and do not entail a signiﬁ cant degree of discretion. 
Furthermore, supervision over the exercise of such prerogatives must be 
ensured to the extent that the balance of powers in the area of EU external 
relations is maintained.105 Accordingly, EU agencies can exercise interna-
tional cooperation prerogatives as long as this is authorised explicitly or 
implicitly by their legal framework and provided that such prerogatives 
are limited by and instrumental to the EU agencies’ mission and objec-
tives. An important validating factor, especially when the founding acts do 
not include (detailed) provisions on international cooperation tasks and 
instruments, is supposedly acceptance by the main EU institutions of the 
instruments enacted by EU agencies in practice.106 
Arrangements of a soft law nature concluded by EU agencies with 
candidates and potential candidates would not be so problematic, since 
they are not likely to be perceived as encroaching upon the powers of 
EU institutions.107 Conversely, if some of these instruments are binding 
international agreements, objections based on the particular balance of 
powers established by the founding treaties with regard speciﬁ cally to EU 
treaty-making can still be raised.108 This seems to be the case because 
of the (strict) stance admittedly taken by the CJEU with regard to this 
issue.109 According to the Court, the founding treaties set up a particular 
balance of powers with regard to formal EU treaty-making. Thus, com-
103  AE Boyle, ‘Some Reﬂ ections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’ (2001) 48(4) 
ICLQ 905. See also L Senden, ‘Soft Law in European Community Law. Its Relationship to 
Legislation’ (DPhil thesis, Tilburg University 2003) 106.
104  Including international agreements concluded by the EU.
105  This would further imply that formal agreements and arrangements concluded by EU 
bodies could be attributed also to the EU. Cf Ott (n 2) 539-540.
106  So far, in practice, EU agencies’ international cooperation tasks and instruments do not 
seem to have encountered signiﬁ cant opposition from the main EU institutions.
107  Cf Case C-233/02 France v Commission (n 98) paras 40-45.
108  See, for details, Ott (n 2). 
109  See Case C-327/1991 France v Commission (n 98) and Case C-233/02 France v Com-
mission (n 98).
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petence to conclude treaties on behalf of the Union lies with the Council, 
while the Commission,110 in principle, initiates the treaty-making proce-
dure and is heavily involved in the negotiation process.111 From this, one 
could infer that binding international agreements concluded by EU agen-
cies, as well as the provisions in their founding acts providing for such 
instruments, are incompatible with the balance of powers established 
in Article 218 TFEU with regard to EU treaty-making. However, in the 
international law literature it is maintained that the organs competent to 
conclude agreements on behalf of an international organisation can, in 
principle, delegate their prerogatives to other organs or bodies if this is 
not explicitly or implicitly prohibited by the constitution of the organisa-
tion.112 Referring now to the EU context, while the Court emphasises the 
particular balance of powers with regard to EU treaty-making, it seems, 
however, that the CJEU does not read in the founding treaty that there 
is an absolute prohibition of delegating such prerogatives to other EU 
institutions and bodies. As suggested by Advocate General Alber with 
regard speciﬁ cally to the Commission’s capacity to conclude agreements, 
the balance of powers with regard to treaty-making does not mean that 
the Council could never delegate such power and that the Commission 
could never conclude an agreement.113 This would rather mean that the 
power of the Commission to conclude agreements is speciﬁ c and must 
necessarily ﬂ ow from the powers conferred by the Council.114 By extend-
ing this reasoning to EU agencies, limited prerogatives could be delegat-
ed to these bodies115 by an act of secondary legislation emanating from 
110  After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative is also involved 
in this process.
111  See Article 218 TFEU.
112  See H Chiu, The Capacity of International Organisations to Conclude Treaties, and the 
Special Legal Aspects of the Treaties so Concluded (Martinus Nijhoff 1966) 89-90.
113  See Case C-233/02 France v Commission (n 98) Opinion of AG Alber delivered on 25 
December 2003, para 71.
114  ibid.
115  One may wonder though whether such delegation should always be explicit or whether 
it could also result from more general provisions on international cooperation or from the 
way in which the objectives and functions of the agency are designed. This would very much 
depend on how the requirement regarding the sufﬁ ciently deﬁ ned and non-discretionary 
nature of the powers conferred on EU agencies is read. While explicit provisions with regard 
to the prerogative of EU agencies to conclude international cooperation instruments would 
certainly help alleviating legal concerns, in other instances, objections can be raised as to 
the international dimension of the mandate of the agency. As already discussed, a solution 
would be a more ﬂ exible reading of the Meroni requirements founded on a functional ap-
proach, deriving the international cooperation prerogatives of the respective agency from its 
overall aims and functions. However, it is not sure whether the CJEU would be willing to 
embrace such a solution, considering the view taken in its previous case law with regard to 
the external powers of the Commission. See Case C-327/1991 France v Commission (n 98) 
and Case C-233/02 France v Commission (n 98). 
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the main EU institutions (the Council, the European Parliament, and 
the Commission) to conclude binding international agreements inherent 
to the fulﬁ lment of their mandate and subject to appropriate supervi-
sion mechanisms.116 Such instruments concluded by EU agencies would 
qualify as ‘administrative agreements’117 or as ‘agreements for technical 
cooperation’ - a category acknowledged as such in the international legal 
literature and practice, though still subject to controversy118 - and could 
be in line with the present-day requirements of institutional balance and 
delegation of powers.119
5. The case of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
5.1. The legal and policy background
The involvement of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in 
the process of enlargement needs to be linked to the policy, legal and 
institutional context of its area of operation.120 EASA became operational 
in 2003 in an environment ‘replete’ with organisations and bodies at all 
levels - international (International Civil Aviation Organisation - ICAO), 
European (Eurocontrol), the EU (Commission) and Member States, as 
well as third countries (national aviation authorities).121 The agency itself 
was built upon the pan-European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), an in-
formal network entrusted with standardisation and inspection tasks em-
bracing the national aviation authorities of most European countries.122 
116  Obviously, the EU agencies cannot claim general power to conclude legally binding 
agreements with non-EU actors based merely on their internal powers.
117  See J Klabbers, ‘The Concept of Treaty in International Law’ (DPhil thesis, University of 
Amsterdam, Kluwer Law International 1996) 97-108.
118  See Chiu (n 112) 122-138 and 168-177; HG Schermers and NM Blokker, International 
Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity (5th rev edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 
1139-1149.
119  The agreements concluded by Europol, Eurojust, and Cepol seem to reﬂ ect a Meroni-
like scenario because such powers are conferred by a Council decision (founding act). Fur-
thermore, the exercise of these prerogatives by the respective agencies is subjected to the 
Council’s supervision and control (see Article 23 of the Europol founding decision; Article 
26a of the Eurojust founding decision; Article 8 of the Cepol founding decision). Cf Ott (n 
2) 539-540.
120  See generally on the transport sector in the context of the enlargement process, V Kro-
nenberger ‘Transport’ in Ott and Inglis (n 28) 965-995.
121  See M Groenleer ‘Linking up Levels of Governance: Agencies of the European Union and 
their Interaction with International Organisations’ in O Costa and K-E Joergensen (eds), 
The Inﬂ uence of International Institutions on the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 
135.
122  See A Schout ‘Inspecting Aviation Safety in the EU: EASA as an Administrative In-
novation?’ in E Vos (ed), European Risk Governance: Its Science, its Inclusiveness and its 
Effectiveness (Connex Report Series Nr 06, 2008) 266-270. JAA was an associate body of 
the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), representing the civil aviation regulatory 
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In this context, EASA has been equipped with regulatory, certiﬁ cation 
and standardisation tasks in the EU aviation safety area.123 As a result, 
by way of a Protocol to the so-called ‘Cyprus Arrangements’,124 EASA has 
been involved in the JAA with a view to preserving ‘the pan-European 
dimension of Civil Aviation safety and environmental protection regula-
tion’.125 Within this framework, EASA has been enabled to coordinate the 
work of the aviation authorities of the Member States, to represent them 
on matters within EU exclusive competence, and to cooperate with JAA 
authorities not subject to the EASA Regulation.126 
These developments should be seen as part of the overall EU exter-
nal aviation policy strategy aimed at creating a European Common Avia-
tion Area. The Common Aviation Area is intended to become ultimately 
a single pan-European air transport market, based on a common set of 
rules applicable to the EU and its neighbours.127 In this framework, the 
EU perceives itself as the main institutional and regulatory driver, im-
plying that the non-EU participant countries should progressively adopt 
the Union’s standards and rules.128 In furthering this policy aim, the EU 
authorities of a number of European States who had agreed to cooperate in developing and 
implementing common safety regulatory standards and procedures. This cooperation was 
intended to provide high and consistent standards of safety and a ‘level playing ﬁ eld’ for 
competition in Europe. JAA ofﬁ cially ended on 30 June 2009 and has been replaced gradu-
ally by working arrangements concluded between EASA and national aviation authorities 
from European countries that are not members of the EU with a view to ensuring the pan-
European dimension of aviation safety. See JAA, <http://www.jaa.nl/introduction/intro-
duction.html>; for a concrete illustration, see the Preamble to the Working Arrangement 
between EASA and the Croatian Civil Aviation Agency, signed on 7 July 2009 <http://easa.
europa.eu/rulemaking/docs/international/croatia/WA%20CROATIA.pdf>. 
123  M Groenleer, M Kaeding, and E Versluis ‘Regulatory Governance through Agencies of 
the European Union? The Role of the European Agencies for Maritime and Aviation Safety 
in the Implementation of European Transport Legislation’ JEPP (17) 1221. See also the Pre-
amble to EASA’s initial founding act - Regulation (EC) 1592/2002 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 15 July 2002 on common rules in the ﬁ eld of civil aviation and 
establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency [2002] OJ L240/1.
124  Arrangements concerning the Development, the Acceptance and the Implementation of 
Joint Aviation Requirements, concluded in Cyprus on 11 September 1990 <https://easa.
europa.eu/rulemaking/docs/international/archive/cyprus.pdf>.
125  Recital (3) of the Preamble of the Protocol to the Cyprus Arrangements on the Participa-
tion of the European Aviation Safety Agency, concluded on 25 November 2003
<http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/docs/international/archive/Protocol_Cyprus.pdf>.
126  See Articles 4-6 of the Protocol to the Cyprus Arrangements (n 125).
127  See Commission (EC), ‘A Community aviation policy towards its neighbours’ (Commu-
nication) (2004) 74 ﬁ nal. See also Commission (EC), ‘Developing the agenda for the Com-
munity’s external aviation policy’ (Communication) (2005) 79 ﬁ nal and Commission (EC), 
‘Common aviation area with the neighbouring countries by 2010 - progress report’ (Com-
munication) (2008) 596 ﬁ nal.
128  See COM (2004) 74 (n 127) 6. See also COM (2005) 79 (n 127), COM (2008) 596 (n 127), 
and the information note on the ECAA posted on the website of the European Commission, 
in the section ‘International Aviation - ECAA’ <http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/inter-
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and its Member States concluded in 2006 an Agreement on the estab-
lishment of a European Common Aviation Area (ECAA)129 with several 
European countries,130 with further negotiations on the way for other 
countries, including Turkey, to join the system.131 
In this context, EASA serves as an instrument designed to con-
tribute to the fulﬁ lment of ECAA. Thus, EASA provides assistance to 
non-EU states with regard to EU aviation standards and integrates the 
competent aviation authorities from such countries into its own system. 
Moreover, EASA is monitoring the process of alignment and implementa-
tion by these countries of the relevant EU legislation.132 It is also from 
this speciﬁ c angle that EASA’s relations with candidate and potential 
candidate countries should be viewed.
5.2 The involvement of EASA in the enlargement process
To begin with, EASA’s founding regulation provides explicitly for par-
ticipation in the agency (including the management board) by European 
third countries that have entered into agreements with the EU and that 
apply EU aviation law.133 For candidate and potential candidate countries 
speciﬁ cally,134 participation in the work of EASA is further stipulated in 
the ECAA agreement.135 As a result, the management board of EASA 
now includes observers from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.136 
national_aviation/country_index/doc/information_note_ecaa.pdf> last updated 9 October 
2012.
129  Multilateral Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, the 
Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of 
Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Iceland, the Republic 
of Montenegro, the Kingdom of Norway, Romania, the Republic of Serbia and the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo on the establishment of a European 
Common Aviation Area [2006] OJ L285/3, also referred to in this paper as the ‘ECAA agree-
ment’.
130  These include current candidate and potential candidate countries, except for Turkey.
131  See COM (2008) 596 (n 127).
132  See, for instance, the Preamble to the Working Arrangement between the European 
Aviation Safety Agency and the Croatian Civil Aviation Agency (n 122).
133  Articles 34 (2) and 66 of EASA’s founding regulation (n 14).
134  Except for Turkey.
135  See, in particular, Annex V of the ECAA agreement (n 129).
136  See EASA’s Annual Report 2010, 50 <http://easa.europa.eu/management-board/
docs/management-board-meetings/2011/02/EASA%20MB%20Decision%2005-2011%2
0Adopting%20the%202010%20Annual%20General%20Report%20ANNEX%201.pdf> and 
EASA’s Annual Report 2011 <http://easa.europa.eu/communications/docs/annual-re-
port/EASA-Annual_Report_2011.pdf>. See also EASA <http://easa.europa.eu/manage-
ment-board/management-board.php>.
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Special mention should be made of Croatia, since it became an ‘acceding 
country’ as of December 2011. Accordingly, Croatia’s representatives in 
EASA’s management board should currently have the status of ‘active 
observer’, entailing active participation in the activities and meetings of 
this body, except for the right to participate in the adoption of ﬁ nal deci-
sions. Iceland is a special case, as it is granted the status of member of 
EASA’s management board, but without voting rights.137 While in all cas-
es a candidate or potential candidate country is not directly involved in 
decision-making, there is, however, a differentiation between the West-
ern Balkan countries (except for Croatia) and Iceland. Thus, in the latter 
case, participation in the management board entails more than passive 
observation, but also the possibility to take an active stance through the 
right to speak, make observations, etc. As an ‘acceding country’, Croatia 
should have a position similar to that of Iceland. One may conclude that 
EASA is an exemplary EU agency, since participation in the manage-
ment board by most candidate and potential candidate countries to EU 
accession is activated. As regards the degree of participation in the man-
agement board, this does not seem to deviate from the standard model 
applied within other EU agencies. 
As far as technical assistance to candidate and potential candidate 
countries is concerned, EASA’s actions seem to remain within the gen-
eral blueprint entailed by this form of EU agencies’ involvement. Thus, 
according to its own activity reports, EASA has contributed mainly to 
deﬁ ning and implementing various assistance projects and programmes 
involving candidate and potential candidate countries. More speciﬁ cally, 
EASA provides support to the Commission in deﬁ ning relevant Euro-
pean assistance projects and managing EU programmes.138 In this con-
text, EASA also manages directly assistance projects and programmes 
for candidate and potential candidate countries with a view to ensuring 
familiarisation with and implementation of EU aviation rules, as well 
as the full integration of the aviation authorities of such countries in 
the EASA system. For instance, EASA managed a dedicated assistance 
programme for the Balkan countries under a convention signed with the 
European Commission Directorate for Enlargement as part of the CARDS 
programme.139 Another recent example is the involvement of EASA in the 
IPA multi-beneﬁ ciary programmes on preparatory measures for the par-
137  EASA’s Annual Report 2010 (n 136) 50 and EASA’s Annual Report 2011 (n 136) 106. 
A similar status is granted to the other EEA countries that are not members of the EU and 
to Switzerland.
138  See EASA’s Annual Report 2010 (n 136) 64.
139  EASA’s Annual Report 2008, 29 <http://easa.europa.eu/management-board/docs/
management-board-meetings/2009/02/EASA%20MB%20Decision%2005-2009%20An-
nex%201%20-%202008%20Annual%20General%20Report.pdf>. 
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ticipation of candidate and potential candidates in EU agencies.140 Un-
der this programme, EASA receives a direct grant from the Commission 
to carry out various preparatory measures such as training activities, 
workshops, and outreach actions. By the same token, EASA also organ-
ises technical assistance missions in candidate and potential candidate 
countries141 and other assistance activities to support the aviation au-
thorities from these countries to improve their expertise.142 
This overview of EASA’s technical assistance activities in the context 
of enlargement reveals overall consistency with the Meroni logic. Thus, 
EASA’s actions really seem limited to technical support and implement-
ing activities and do not normally materialise in legally binding acts. 
Such activities seem to correspond to the role and tasks of the agency as 
speciﬁ ed in the founding regulation and other relevant legal instruments. 
With regard speciﬁ cally to the assistance actions performed within the 
framework of EU programmes, these entail clear delegation from and 
supervision by the Commission.
As concerns the monitoring process of the progress of candidates 
and potential candidates in transposing and implementing the relevant 
EU acquis, EASA has admittedly an important say. This is linked to EA-
SA’s standardisation tasks derived from the JAA system, consolidated 
inter alia via the ECAA agreement and grounded in the founding regula-
tion of EASA.143 Such tasks entail monitoring the implementation of EU 
legislation144 both by the Member States and by relevant third countries 
(including ECAA countries). The standardisation process includes in-
spection visits in the relevant countries and is materialised in reports 
that are also forwarded to the Commission.145 With regard speciﬁ cally 
to candidate and potential candidates for accession,146 it is important to 
note that EASA has concluded working arrangements with the competent 
aviation authorities comprising provisions that pertain to the manner in 
which EASA oversees the implementation of the relevant EU legislation 
in these countries. Linking this with the monitoring process in the con-
text of enlargement, it should be noted that the periodic progress reports 
released by the Commission on candidates and potential candidates also 
140  See Project Fiche No 14 ‘Participation in EU Agencies’ (n 53) 3-5.
141  See EASA’s Annual Report 2010 (n 136) 64-65.
142  ibid 35.
143  See Article 24 of EASA’s founding regulation (n 14).
144  As stipulated by EASA’s founding regulation (n 14).
145  See Commission Regulation (EC) 736/2006 of 16 May 2006 on working methods of the 
European Aviation Safety Agency for conducting standardisation inspections [2006] OJ 
L129/10.
146  Including Turkey.
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cover the air transport policy area. More speciﬁ cally, such reports usu-
ally include speciﬁ c ﬁ ndings concerning the positive results and exist-
ing problems with regard to the implementation of EU standards in the 
aviation area.147 An example illustrating the impact that the monitoring 
tasks performed by EASA may have in the enlargement process is the 
notorious ‘Bulgarian’ case. In this case, the Commission invoked a ‘safe-
guard clause’ against Bulgaria in 2006, following a negative inspection 
report prepared by EASA, stating that Bulgaria had not been able to 
ensure full compliance with EU rules on aviation safety.148 As a result of 
the activation of the safeguard clause, Bulgaria was partially excluded 
from the beneﬁ ts of the internal aviation market.149 
However, EASA’s monitoring and inspection tasks in relation to can-
didate and potential candidate countries seem not to cause problems 
as far as institutional balance and delegation of powers are concerned. 
Such tasks naturally derive from the external dimension of the EU avia-
tion policy and are a necessary supportive element in the technicali-
ties of the enlargement process. Besides, these tasks are enshrined in 
EASA’s founding regulation and in other legal instruments (including 
international agreements and working arrangements). Last, the exercise 
of these tasks is materialised in non-binding instruments (ie reports), 
leaving to the Commission the required margin of (political) discretion to 
decide on the appropriate course of action.
Finally, as far as formalised cooperation instruments are concerned, 
it should be noted that EASA has concluded so far working arrange-
ments with more than 30 third countries, including candidate and po-
tential candidate countries.150 The possibility for EASA to use such for-
malised cooperation instruments is explicitly provided for in the agency’s 
founding regulation.151 Furthermore, one should not overlook that the 
147  For example, Commission (EC) ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 Progress Report’ (n 65) 
49.
148  Commission (EC) ‘Monitoring report on the state of preparedness for EU membership of 
Bulgaria and Romania’ (Communication) COM (2006) 549 ﬁ nal, 26 September 2006, 12 and 
Commission Regulation (EC) 1962/2006 of 21 December 2006 in application of Article 37 of 
the Act of Accession of Bulgaria to the European Union [2006] OJ L408/8. See also Spern-
bauer (n 28) 286; Groenleer, Kaeding, and Versluis (n 123) 1224; and the European Commis-
sion’s press release, ‘European Commission Invokes Safeguard Clause against Bulgaria on 
Aviation Safety’ (IP/06/1860, 20 December 2006) <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases-
Action.do?reference=IP/06/1860&type=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>.
149  See Commission Regulation (EC) 1962/2006 (n 148). See also the European Commis-
sion’s press release (n 148).
150  According to the information available on the ofﬁ cial website of EASA in the section 
‘International Cooperation - Working Arrangements’ <http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/
international-cooperation-working-arrangements.php>.
151  Article 27 of EASA’s founding regulation (n 14).
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working arrangements concluded by EASA with the competent authori-
ties from candidate and potential candidate countries are also to be seen 
as implementing tools of a wider international framework, including the 
ECAA and EEA agreements and the European Civil Aviation Conference 
(ECAC). One should further add that, as a rule,152 EASA has concluded 
two types of working arrangements with the competent authorities from 
candidates and potential candidates: (1) on the collection and exchange 
of information on aircraft safety to implement the Safety Assessment of 
Foreign Aircraft (SAFA) Programme,153 and (2) on regulatory cooperation 
and standardisation, in the context of the transition from JAA to the 
EASA system.154 
As far as the legal nature of the working arrangements concluded by 
EASA is concerned, it is difﬁ cult to provide a straightforward answer. A 
closer look at some of these instruments reveals a rather mixed picture. 
Thus, the use of the word ‘arrangement’ instead of ‘agreement’ would 
suggest a non-binding instrument.155 In addition, the working arrange-
ments regarding regulatory cooperation and standardisation usually in-
clude a similar clause stating that they ‘(…) do not affect or limit in any 
way the rights and obligations stemming from the relevant provisions of 
the ECAA Agreement’.156 On this basis, one might tentatively conclude 
that such arrangements are not binding international agreements. 
However, other elements of the same instruments perhaps point to 
a different conclusion. In particular, the provisions regarding the stand-
ardisation procedure, the liaison activities, the entry into force as well as 
152  The exception is Iceland, whose competent aviation authority has only concluded a 
working arrangement on collection and exchange of information on aircraft safety. See 
EASA <http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/international-cooperation-working-arrange-
ments.php>.
153  Initially developed by the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), SAFA was trans-
ferred to the EU by Directive (EC) 2004/36 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 21 April 2004 on the safety of third-country aircraft using Community airports [2004] OJ 
L143/76 (the so-called ‘SAFA Directive’). See, for instance, Commission (EC), ‘Report from 
the Commission on the European Community SAFA Programme (Safety Assessment of For-
eign Aircraft)’ [2008] OJ C42/1 and the information ﬁ che ‘The EC SAFA Programme: Past, 
Present and Future’ <http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/safety/doc/2009_12_04_
info_ﬁ che_safa_programme.pdf> last updated 9 October 2012. 
154  See EASA <http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/international-cooperation-working-ar-
rangements.php>.
155  However, in international law, the label of the instrument alone is not considered as 
sufﬁ cient evidence for supporting a conclusion regarding the legal nature of the respective 
instrument. See A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2003) 
20-24; Klabbers (n 117) 68-72.
156  For example the Working Arrangement concluded with the Directorate General of Civil 
Aviation of the Republic of Albania, signed on 7 July 2009, 6
<http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/docs/international/albania/WA%20ALBANIA.pdf>; 
the Working Arrangement concluded with the Croatian Civil Aviation Agency (n 122) 6.
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the amendment and termination procedure suggest that such working 
arrangements might contain legally binding commitments.157 A similar 
conclusion could also be advanced with regard to the working arrange-
ments pertaining to information exchange, all the more so as these in-
struments also contain rather precise implementing actions and conﬁ -
dentiality duties for the parties. Moreover, unlike the ﬁ rst category, such 
arrangements do not include an explicit clause limiting their legal ef-
fects. But even with regard to the ‘limiting’ clause included in the work-
ing arrangements on regulatory cooperation and standardisation, one 
may argue that this does not necessarily deny any legal effects of such 
instruments. It rather clariﬁ es that such working arrangements are im-
plementing tools of a basic international agreement and, as a result, they 
must comply with the latter.158 Finally, the use in the working arrange-
ments concluded by EASA of a treaty-like language such as the parties 
‘have agreed as follows’ or the parties ‘shall’159 is another factor pointing 
to a binding international agreement. All these elements seem to indicate 
the intention of the parties to create legally binding obligations.160
In sum, the legal nature of the working arrangements concluded by 
EASA with third countries, in general, and with candidate and potential 
candidate countries, in particular, is not entirely clear. While the qualiﬁ -
cation of these arrangements as soft law cooperation instruments would 
probably avoid difﬁ cult legal discussions, not the same thing can be said 
about the ﬁ nding that some of EASA’s formalised cooperation instru-
ments could actually qualify as binding international agreements. 
First, one may suspect that the principle of institutional balance is 
breached, since treaty-making is reserved for the institutions mentioned 
in Article 218 TFEU.161 However, as already discussed, while the CJEU 
emphasises the importance of the principle of institutional balance in 
the context of EU treaty-making, it seems that the Court does not neces-
sarily read in the founding treaties that there is an absolute prohibition 
to delegate such prerogatives to other EU institutions and bodies. Provid-
157  Cf Ott (n 2) 535-538.
158  To that effect, this would actually equate with a conﬁ rmation of the legal effects of this 
category of working arrangements.
159  This applies, in particular, to the conﬁ dentiality clauses in the working arrangements 
pertaining to information exchange.
160  To put it more simply, as long as a cooperation instrument has the form and content 
of a treaty, one may presume its legal character as an international agreement. Cf Chiu (n 
112) 209-212, also quoting the opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in his second report on the 
Law of treaties. Or, as Klabbers puts it, as soon as it becomes clear that an instrument is 
concluded with a view to creating commitments between the parties under international 
law, it constitutes an international agreement. See Klabbers (n 117) 249-250.
161  Ott (n 2) 535-538.
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ed that this delegation scenario is applicable also to EU agencies, several 
requirements would need to be fulﬁ lled in accordance with the present-
day understanding of the Meroni doctrine. Thus, international coopera-
tion prerogatives, including powers to conclude international agreements 
must be: 1. conferred by the main institutions via the founding act and 
other relevant legal instruments; 2. strictly circumscribed to the man-
date of the agency, and; 3. subject to appropriate supervision. This seems 
to be the case with the working arrangements concluded by EASA be-
cause these are explicitly authorised by the agency’s founding act and 
their scope is strictly limited to technical cooperation activities which 
come within the mandate of the agency. Furthermore, EASA’s working 
arrangements are subjected to the Commission’s prior approval.162 This 
alleviates the concerns regarding oversight over EASA’s actions, but also 
implies that EASA could be considered as acting on behalf of the EU 
when concluding arrangements with candidate or potential candidate 
countries.163 
Second, the ﬁ nding that (some of) the working arrangements con-
cluded by EASA with candidates to EU accession may contain binding 
commitments triggers important practical and legal consequences.164 If 
some EU agencies can conclude internationally binding instruments, it 
follows that such bodies are subject to legal obligations and that they 
can be held liable at the international level for the non-fulﬁ lment of their 
duties. This could ultimately lead to the EU as such being bound by such 
commitments entered into by EU agencies and being held internationally 
liable,165 provided that these bodies act as EU ‘agents’. Such a conclu-
sion would apply to EASA as well, because the agency, while concluding 
working arrangements on its own behalf, can hardly be assumed to act 
independently as long as it must always obtain the Commission’s ap-
proval.
6. Conclusion
This analysis reveals that, apart from the formalised cooperation 
instruments used by EU agencies, the forms in which these bodies par-
take in the process of enlargement are compatible overall with the EU 
legal framework. As far as the formalised cooperation instruments (ar-
rangements, agreements, memoranda of understanding, etc) are con-
cerned, these seem not to contravene the institutional balance and the 
162  Article 27 of Regulation (EC) 216/2008 (n 14).
163  Cf Ott (n 2) 539-540.
164  ibid 534, 538-540.
165  ibid 540. Cf Klabbers arguing in a slightly different context that administrative agree-
ments concluded by agencies become ultimately ‘(...) the onus of the state’ (n 117) 103. 
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delegation of power principles as long as they remain outside the realm 
of hard law and within the respective mandate of the agency. However, 
the ﬁ nding that some of these instruments are legally binding triggers 
important consequences under international law. It further raises the 
question whether such ‘agreements’ would infringe the balance of powers 
laid down by the founding treaties between the institutions involved in 
the area of EU external action and, in particular, with regard to the Un-
ion’s capacity to conclude international agreements. Objections against 
such ‘empowerment’ of EU agencies can be raised in particular in view 
of the rather conventional reading by the CJEU of the balance of pow-
ers between the EU institutions with regard to the Union’s treaty-mak-
ing. However, assuming that the Court does not institute an absolute 
prohibition to ‘delegate’ (limited) treaty-making prerogatives to other EU 
institutions and bodies, one can advance arguments for an ‘escape route’ 
based on a dynamic interpretation of the principle of institutional bal-
ance and of the delegation/conferment of power doctrine. According to 
this view, international cooperation prerogatives, including limited func-
tional powers to conclude international agreements, may be conferred 
on EU agencies by the main EU institutions. Such prerogatives should 
be authorised via the founding acts of the agencies and other relevant 
instruments of secondary legislation, and they must be strictly circum-
scribed to the mandate of the agency, and subject to appropriate supervi-
sion by the relevant EU institutions. 
Finally, what is questionable in legal theory seems to be accepted in 
daily reality, where, in spite of the use of such ‘problematic’ instruments 
by some EU agencies, no litigation has been initiated so far on this par-
ticular issue. This might indicate that recourse to such actions by EU 
agencies is not perceived as problematic in practice. On the contrary, it 
might be a response to some present-day practical needs within EU and 
global governance.

